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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with two 
types of workers and jobs. The technology is such that high-skill workers can perform all jobs, 
while low-skill workers can only perform unskilled jobs. In this setup two types equilibria may 
occur. A “cross-skill matching equilibrium” in which high-skill workers accept all jobs and an 
“ex-post segmentation equilibrium” in which they accept only skilled jobs. Our first result shows 
that the equilibrium with ex-post bargaining is never efficient. Second, under Hosios´ (1990) 
condition we show that low-skill workers are overvalued, while the opposite holds for high-skill 
workers. In equilibrium, firms therefore create too few unskilled jobs and too many skilled jobs. 
In addition, high-skill workers may decide to accept unskilled jobs while the efficient allocation 
features ex-post segmentation. Finally, in an extension we show that efficiency can be restored 
through taxation and we analyze how workers´ bargaining strength affects unemployment and the 
degree of skill-mismatch. 
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the efficiency of the resource allocation in a matching
model with two types of workers and jobs. Workers’ skills are exogenous and
we assume that high-skill workers can do both jobs, skilled and unskilled,
while low-skill workers can only perform unskilled jobs. This setup, first
introduced by Albrecht and Vroman (2002), is useful to study phenomena
like skill-biased technological change or low-wage competition. However, so
far little is known about the efficiency properties of these models.
Our objective in this paper is to characterise the entire set of possible
steady state equilibria with random search and ex post bargaining. As in
Albrecht and Vroman we therefore need to distinguish between two types
of equilibria. A cross-skill matching equilibrium in which high-skill workers
accept both types of jobs and an ex post segmentation equilibrium in which
these workers only match with skilled jobs. To achieve this goal we compare
the equilibrium with the efficient allocation chosen by a social planner. This
planner controls the mass of the two types of vacancies and the optimal
matching rule for high-skill workers and her objective is to maximise the
value of net-output.
Our first result shows that the equilibrium with ex post bargaining is
never efficient. Second, under Hosios’ (1990) condition we show that high-
skill workers are undervalued in equilibrium while the opposite holds for
low-skill workers. In a cross-skill matching equilibrium this results in an
insufficient number of unskilled jobs as firms need to pay low-skill workers
more than their shadow value. Furthermore, due to the undervaluation of
high-skill workers, there may be cases in which these workers accept unskilled
jobs while the efficient allocation features ex post segmentation.
The result that the labour market tends to create too few unskilled jobs
achieves our first goal. Namely, to show that the presence of high-skill workers
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tends to harm low-skill workers by raising their unemployment rate above the
socially optimal level. Furthermore, our results suggest that this distortion
becomes even stronger when we move from cross-skill matching to ex-post
segmentation. In the latter case high-skill workers no longer occupy unskilled
jobs, but this effect is more than offset by a discrete fall in the supply of
these jobs. Finally, it should be noted that our model can also generate the
opposite result, i.e. over-creation of unskilled jobs. The latter occurs when
workers’ surplus share is sufficiently smaller than the Hosios’ value. In this
parameter region, firms create too many jobs and a suboptimally large share
of these jobs is unskilled. In contrast, for sufficiently high values of workers’
bargaining power, the fraction of unskilled jobs is above the efficient value,
but because the overall number of vacancies per job seeker is too low, the
unemployment rate of low-skill workers is still suboptimally high.
To understand the intuition behind our results, it is convenient to make a
comparison with the results of Hosios (1990). For an environment with ex
ante homogeneous agents he demonstrated that the equilibrium is efficient if
workers’ bargaining power is equal to the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to the mass of unemployed workers. In that case, the search
externalities are perfectly internalised in the wage and unemployed workers’
expected income coincides with their shadow value.
In contrast, in our economy an additional unemployed worker congests
the market for workers with different skill levels. The absolute value of this
externality is the same for both types of workers. However, in the case of
a high-skill worker it corresponds to a lower share of her expected future
productivity than in the case of a low-skill worker. When Hosios’ condition
is satisfied, high-skill workers are therefore under-valued in equilibrium while
the opposite holds for low-skill workers.
The above argument seems to suggest that there may exist a pair of
surplus shares, one for each type of worker, that decentralises the efficient
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allocation. However, this is not the case. In our model Hosios’ condition is
necessary to ensure that firms create the right number of jobs per job seeker.
When we introduce different bargaining strengths to correct the distortion
of the job distribution – the over-creation of skilled jobs and the under-
creation of unskilled jobs – we would therefore end up with an inefficient
number of jobs.1 Instead, it is easy to show that the efficient allocation can
be decentralised through taxation. In the paper we analyse the case of lump
sum taxes on unemployed workers, showing that the government should levy
a tax on unemployed workers with a low skill level, while workers with a high
skill level should receive a subsidy during unemployment. The proposed
tax scheme confirms our explanation about the source of the over-valuation
(under-valuation) of low-skill (high-skill) workers, but it may be difficult to
implement. An alternative would be to levy a hiring tax on skilled jobs. Also
in this case, the relative profits of skilled jobs go down, but the hiring tax on
skilled jobs avoids the negative income effect on low-skill workers.
1.1 Related literature
The seminal contribution on efficiency with heterogeneous agents is Sattinger
(1995). In his model there is a fixed supply of T types of workers and firms
whose matching rates are fixed. Sattinger’s main result shows that hetero-
geneity may give rise to multiple and inefficient equilibria. Like us, he also
shows that the equilibrium payoffs never coincide with the shadow value of
agents. However, while computing the shadow value of a worker, Sattinger
sterilises the effects on the other workers by increasing the job supply to off-
set any changes in matching probabilities. Distortion of the wage payments
therefore arise because workers ignore the costs of the firms with whom they
interview and not because of the congestion effects on other workers as in our
1The details of the proof are available upon request.
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case. Our work is therefore more closely related to Shimer and Smith (2001a,
2001b) who use a social planner problem to derive the efficient allocations in
an environment with assortative matching and endogeneous search intensity.
In Shimer and Smith (2001b) the aim is to show that the model may have
efficient non-stationary allocations. Our work is closer in spirit to Shimer and
Smith (2001a). In this paper the authors show that the decentralised equi-
librium is never efficient without search subsidies. In particular, in the de-
centralised equilibrium without subsidies, the most productive agents do not
search hard enough and they accept too many (low-productivity) matches.
In contrast, low-productivity types search too hard and they reject too many
matches. An optimal tax scheme therefore involves a search subsidy for the
high-productivity agents and a search penalty for the low-productivity work-
ers.
This last result is somewhat similar to our optimal tax scheme. However,
the advantage of our simple model is that we can immediately relate our
results to the well-known results of Hosios. Hence, while Shimer and Smith
(2002a) obtain the inefficiency of the resource allocation via the derivation
of a non-trivial tax scheme, we are able to prove that low-skill workers are
over-valued in equilibrium. Moreover, our results indicate that this is a
general feature of models with ex ante heterogeneous agents. One of the
main contributions of this paper is therefore that we provide a clear intuition
for the inefficiency of the resource allocation in economies with heterogeneous
agents and ex post bargaining. Finally, Shimer and Smith (2002a) consider
an economy with fixed pool of agents, while we allow for free entry of firms.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. The next section derives the two possible equilibrium configurations.
The set of efficient allocation is derived in Section 4. This section starts
with a characterisation of efficient cross-skill matching allocations. Next, we
discuss the efficient allocations with ex post segmentation and at the end of
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the section we derive the optimal matching rule of high-skill workers, showing
that high-skill workers may accept unskilled jobs while the efficient allocation
features ex post segmentation. Finally, in section 5 we derive the optimal
taxes and we show how extreme values of the bargaining strength may lead
to overcreation of unskilled jobs.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Assumptions
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of risk-neutral workers with
measure normalised to unity. The distribution of workers’ abilities is exoge-
nous. Specifically, we assume that a fraction µ ∈ (0, 1) of the workers is
low-skill (l), while the remaining fraction 1−µ is high-skill (h). All workers
are infinitely-live and time is continuous.
There are two types of jobs: skilled jobs (s) , and unskilled jobs (u). The
technology is such that, unskilled jobs can be done by either type of workers,
while skilled jobs can only be done by high-skill workers. Furthermore, we as-
sume that high-skill workers are more productive when matched with skilled
jobs, while both types of workers are equally productive in unskilled jobs.
Formally, let y(i, j) define the flow output of a job j(= u, s) that is filled by
a worker of type i(= l, h). Our assumptions on the production technology
can then be summarised as follows:
y(h, s) = y(s) > y(h, u) = y(l, u) = y(u) > y(l, s) = 0
For convenience, we assume that firms can open at most one job. The
choice of the type of job is irreversible, and the mass of each type of job is
determined by a free-entry condition.
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2.2 Matching
Unemployed workers and vacancies are assumed to meet each other randomly.
The total number of matches between a worker and firm is determined by a
constant returns to scale matching function.
X = X (v, u)
where v is the mass of vacancies and u is the mass of unemployed workers. We
assume that X (., .) is strictly increasing in both arguments and we denote
the skilled labour market tightness by θ = vu . Let φ denote the fraction
of unskilled vacancies, and let η be the fraction of low-skill workers among
unemployed. Accordingly, the rate at which skilled vacancies are filled is
given by (1− η) q (θ) = (1− η)X
¡
1, 1θ
¢
. Similarly, the matching rate for
workers is denoted by θq (θ), but since low-skill workers are not qualified
for skilled jobs their effective arrival rate will be φθq (θ). The properties of
the matching function imply that the matching rate of workers (firms) is
increasing (decreasing) in θ and we assume
lim
θ→0
θq (θ) = lim
θ→∞
q (θ) = 0 and lim
θ→0
q (θ) = lim
θ→∞
θq (θ) =∞.
In particular, we are going to analyze the case of a Cobb-Douglas match-
ing function:
X = uαv1−α
The meeting process between workers and vacancies is assumed to be
undirected, in the sense that a low-skill worker encounters a skilled vacancy
(and thus is unable to consummate the match) with a probability per unit
6
of time that is proportional to the fraction of skilled vacancies. Similarly, a
high-skill worker finds an unskilled vacancy with a probability per unit of time
that is proportional to the fraction of unskilled vacancies. In this manner, we
capture the idea that, given the overall labour market conditions, low-skill
workers are better off the greater the fraction of unskilled vacancies, and vice
versa for high-skill workers. Similarly, all else equal, a firm with an unskilled
vacancy is better off the greater the fraction of job seekers that are low-skill.
2.3 Wages and Asset Values
When a match is formed, the firm-worker pair divides the surplus of the
match according to the Nash bargaining solution. The worker’s share of the
surplus is denoted by β ∈ (0, 1). Let U(i) be the value of an unemployed
worker of type i, and let V (j) denote the value of a vacant job of type j. We
also defineW (i, j) as the value of employment for a worker of type i on a job
of type j, and J(i, j) as the value of a type j job filled by a worker of type
i. Accordingly, the surplus generated by a match between a worker of type
i and a job of type j is given by: S(i, j) = W (i, j) + J(i, j) − V (j) − U(i),
and the corresponding wage w (i, j) solves the Nash bargaining solution2:
(1− β) [W (i, j)− U(i)] = β [J(i, j)− V (j)] (1)
We now continue with the derivation of the asset value equations for
workers. Let r be the common discount rate for both firms and workers .
Job destruction is exogenous and follows a Poisson process with arrival rate
s that is common for both jobs. Whenever a job is destroyed, the worker
becomes unemployed while the job becomes vacant. Let b < y(u) denote the
flow income of an unemployed worker, which is assumed to be equal for both
2A match between a worker of type i and a job of type j will be formed if and only if
S(i, j) ≥ 0
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types of workers, and which is to be interpreted as home production without
need of any tax-financing scheme.
rU(h) = b+ θ1−α {φmax [W (h, u)− U(h), 0] + (1− φ) [W (h, s)− U(h)]}
(2)
rW (h, s) = w(h, s)− s [W (h, s)− U(h)] (3)
rW (h, u) = w(h, u)− s [W (h, u)− U(h)] (4)
rU(l) = b+ θ1−αφ [W (l, u)− U(l)] (5)
rW (l, u) = w(l, u)− s [W (l, u)− U(l)] (6)
Equation (2) shows that high-skill workers are capable of undertaking
either skilled or unskilled jobs. This is why the value associated with the
arrival of an unskilled job is max [W (h, u)− U(h), 0]. In contrast, equation
(5) reflects the fact that low-skill workers can only match with unskilled jobs.
Similarly, we derive the asset value equations for filled and unfilled jobs.
Let γ denote the cost, per unit of time of maintaining an unfilled job. The
values of skilled and unskilled vacancies, denoted by V (s) and V (u) respec-
tively , are then given by:
rV (s) = −γ + θ−α (1− η) [J(h, s)− V (s)] (7)
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rV (u) = −γ + θ−α {η [J(l, u)− V (u)] + (1− η)max [J(h, u)− V (u), 0]}
(8)
Equation (7) reflects the fact that skilled vacancies can only be filled
with high-skill workers. However, the value of an unskilled vacancy, given
by equation (8), reflects the assumption that while both worker types can
perform unskilled jobs, it may not be worthwhile for high-skill workers to
accept unskilled jobs. That is why the value of meeting a high-skill worker
is max [J(h, u)− V (u), 0].
The value to a firm of having an unskilled vacancy filled by either low-
, or high-skill workers, is denoted by J(l, u) and J(h, u), respectively, and
satisfies:
rJ(h, u) = y (u)− w(h, u)− s [J(h, u)− V (u)] (9)
rJ(l, u) = y (u)− w(l, u)− s [J(l, u)− V (u)] (10)
while the value to the firm of a skilled job filled by a high-skill worker is:
rJ(h, s) = y (s)− w(h, s)− s [J(h, s)− V (s)] (11)
Substituting equations (2)−(11) into (1), and taking into account that, in
steady state equilibrium, the free entry condition V (j) = 0 must be satisfied
for j ∈ (u, s), we obtain the expression for wages:
w(i, j) = rU(i) + β [y (j)− rU(i)] (12)
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3 Equilibrium
The analysis of the equilibrium allocation of this type of models is completely
developed by A&V(2002).
3.1 Cross-skill Matching
We begin with the derivation of the equilibrium when the matches between
high-skill workers and unskilled vacancies are mutually beneficial and, there-
fore, consummated. We refer to this situation as the “cross-skill matching”
equilibrium. The equilibrium is characterized by a vector of endogenous vari-
ables {θ, φ, η, u} satisfying: (i) two steady state conditions and, (ii) two free
entry conditions.
The steady state conditions require that the flows into and out of unem-
ployment for both types of workers must be equal:
φθ1−αηu = s [µ− ηu] (13)
θ1−α (1− η)u = s [1− µ− (1− η)u] (14)
where φθ1−αηu defines the flow of low-skill workers out of unemployment
and s [µ− ηu] denotes the corresponding flow into unemployment. Similarly,
for high-skill workers, θ1−α (1− η)u denotes the flow of high-skill workers
out of unemployment, and s [1− µ− (1− η)u] the corresponding flow into
unemployment.
The two steady-state conditions can be solved for φ and u in terms of θ
and η. This yields:
φ = µ (1− η) θ
1−α + (µ− η) s
(1− µ) ηθ1−α
(15)
u =
s(1− µ)£
s+ θ1−α
¤
(1− η)
(16)
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Notice that φ is decreasing in η and increasing in θ, the latter so long as η > µ.
This condition is necessarily satisfied in a cross skill matching equilibrium
since low-skill workers exit unemployment at a lower rate than high-skill
workers. Their share in the pool of unemployed workers is therefore larger
than their share in the population.
The other two equations that characterize a cross-skill matching equilib-
rium come from the two free entry conditions. As it turns out, however, it
is more convenient to work with the equivalent conditions V (u) = V (s) = 0.
Using equations (7), (11) and (12), the free entry condition for skilled vacan-
cies can be written as:
γ = θ−α (1− η) (1− β)
·
[y(s)− rU(h)]
r + s
¸
(17)
Similarly, substituting (9), (10) and (12) into (8), the free entry condition
for unskilled vacancies becomes:
γ = θ−α (1− β)
½
η
·
[y(u)− rU(l)]
r + s
¸
+ (1− η)
·
[y(u)− rU(h)]
r + s
¸¾
(18)
where the outside options for both high-, and low-skill workers, rU(h) and
rU(l), are given by the following expressions:
rU(h) = b (r + s) + βθ
1−α [φy(u) + (1− φ)y(s)]
r + s+ βθ1−α
(19)
rU(l) =
b (r + s) + βφθ1−αy (u)
r + s+ βφθ1−α
(20)
Making use of the “equal-value condition”, V (s) = V (u), we obtain the
third equation that characterizes the decentralized equilibrium:
¡
r + s+ βφθ1−α
¢
=
η (r + s) (y(u)− b)
(1− η) (y(s)− y(u)) (21)
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The fourth and last equation is obtained by substitution of (21) into the
free entry condition for skilled vacancies:
γ
¡
r + s+ βθ1−α
¢
= (1− β) θ−α (y(u)− b) (22)
Given our assumption about the matching technology, equation (22) de-
fines a unique solution for θ. Also, from equation (22) it can be observed
that neither changes in the skill distribution of the population, µ, nor changes
in the productivity of skilled jobs, y (s), affect the equilibrium value of the
labour market tightness.
Definition 1 A cross-skill matching equilibrium can be summarized by a
vector {θE, φE, ηE, uE} satisfying equations (15), (16), (21) and (22).
A match will be formed if the surplus of the match is positive, W (i, j) +
J(i, j) ≥ V (j) + U(i). Thus, a cross-skill matching equilibrium exists when-
ever it is worthwhile for high-skill workers to take unskilled jobs. From equa-
tion (18), this will occur if and only if S(h, u) = [y(u)− rU(h)] /(r+ s) ≥ 0,
and so we obtain the following condition for a cross-skill matching equilib-
rium:
y(u)− rU(h) ≥ 0 (23)
Equation (23) implies that, in order for a cross-skill matching equilibrium
to be feasible, the flow output of an unskilled job filled by a high-skill worker
must be greater or equal than the expected lifetime income for this type of
worker.
Finally, before turning to the ex post segmentation equilibrium, we need
to rule out the corner solution in which firms only supply unskilled jobs. In
this situation only unskilled vacancies are offered, φ = 1, that is, the value of
opening skilled vacancies must be negative. The condition on the parameters
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that ensures this is the following (see Albrecht and Vroman (2002))
y(u)− b > (1− µ)
"
y(s)− b+ β (θ
∗)1−α (y(s)− y(u))
r + s
#
(24)
where θ∗ is the value of θ that solves equation (22). Thus, in order to avoid the
corner solution we need that skilled vacancies, filled with high-skill workers,
are sufficiently productive.
3.2 Ex Post Segmentation
In this case, high-skill workers only match with skilled vacancies, that is
y(u)− rU(h) < 0. The two flow conditions now become as follows:
φθ1−αηu = s(µ− ηu) (25)
(1− φ) θ1−α (1− η)u = s [(1− µ)− (1− η)u] (26)
Notice that the steady-state flow condition for low-skill workers is the same
as in the cross-skill matching equilibrium. For high-skill workers, on the
contrary, the exit rate out of unemployment is now reduced to (1− φ) θ1−α.
Finally, following the same reasoning as in the cross-skill matching case,
the two free entry conditions associated with ex post segmentation satisfy:
γ = θ−αη(1− β)
·
[y(u)− b]
r + s+ βφθ1−α
¸
(27)
γ = θ−α (1− η) (1− β)
·
[y(s)− b]
r + s+ β (1− φ) θ1−α
¸
(28)
The free-entry condition for unskilled vacancies, given by equation (27),
is decreasing in θ and increasing η, the latter because, by equation (25), it
can be shown that φ is decreasing in η. On the contrary, the free entry
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condition for skilled vacancies, equation (28), is decreasing in both θ and η.
Thus, increases in the labour market tightness reduce the value of both types
of vacancies. On the other hand, all else equal, as the fraction of low-skilled
among unemployed increases, the value of unskilled (skilled) vacancies in-
creases (decreases). Therefore, equation V (u) = 0 defines an upward curve
in the positive quadrant (θ, η), while equation V (s) = 0 defines a down-
ward curve in the same quadrant. The intersection of both loci, therefore,
determine a unique ex post segmentation equilibrium (Figure 1).
                    η     
                          V(u)=0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  ηE 
                     V(s)=0 
 
 
 
 
                        θE                         θ 
Figure 1: Equilibrium
Thus, if the parameters of the model are consistent with ex post segmen-
tation, there will be a unique equilibrium of this type. The same reasoning
applies to the cross-skill matching equilibrium. However, there may be some
range of parameter values in which both types of equilibria coexist. As
pointed out by Albrecht and Vroman (2002) multiple equilibria can be gen-
erated by a coordination externality. Nonetheless, multiple equilibria do not
occur for all possible parameter configurations. In particular, for an inter-
mediate range of parameter values, there are two pure-strategy equilibrium
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possibilities, one with cross-skill matching and one with ex post segmenta-
tion3.
4 Efficient Allocation
We now turn to the welfare properties of the model. The efficient allocation
is derived using the construct of a “social planner” who chooses the time path
of the masses of vacancies, v(s) and v(u), and unemployed workers, u(h) and
u(l), to maximize the value of net output. Let Y (i, j) = y(i, j)/(r+s) be the
expected productivity of a match between a worker of type i ∈ (l, h) and a
job of type j ∈ (u, s). Finally, let Rt ∈ [0, 1] ∀t define the matching rule for
high-skill workers and unskilled vacancies. If Rt takes value 1, then high-skill
workers should always accept matches with unskilled vacancies (cross-skill
matching), while a value of 0 means that high-skill workers should never
accept unskilled job offers (ex-post segmentation). For any Rt ∈ (0, 1) we
would have a mixed matching strategy.
The social planner’s problem can succinctly be written as:
max
θt,φt,ut,Rt
∞Z
0
{θ1−αt [u(h)t [RtφtY (h, u) + (1− φt)Y (h, s)] + u(l)tφtY (l, u)] +
+b (u(h)t + u(l)t)− γθt (u(h)t + u(l)t)}e−rtdt (29)
s.t
u˙(l)t = s [µ− u(l)t]−
£
φtθ1−αt
¤
u(l)t (30)
u˙(h)t = s [1− µ− u(h)t]−
£
θ1−αt
¤
u(h)t [Rt + (1−Rt) (1− φt)] (31)
3See Albrecht and Vroman (2002) for details.
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In Appendix A we solve for the steady state efficient allocation using the
optimal control.theory Henceforth, we suppress all time subscripts. Further-
more, from the optimality condition for R, it follows immediately that the
optimal matching rule depends on the sign of y(u)− (r+ s)λ(h), where λ(h)
is the shadow value of a high-skill worker:
R =



1 if y(u) > (r + s)λ(h)
∈ [0, 1] if y(u) = (r + s)λ(h)
0 if y(u) < (r + s)λ(h)
(32)
The above result implies that R is generically driven to the boundary.
Thus, we will have either R = 1 (cross-skill matching) or R = 0, (ex post
segmentation).
4.1 Cross-skill Matching
Let us start with the case of an efficient cross-skill matching allocation. When
y(u) > (r + s)λ(h) and R = 1, the efficient allocation is fully characterised
by the following four conditions:4
φ =
µθ1−α (1− η) + (µ− η) s
θ1−α (1− µ) η
(33)
u =
s (1− µ)¡
s+ θ1−α
¢
(1− η)
(34)
4Arrow’s generalization of Mangasarian’s sufficiency theorem (Kamien and Schwartz,
1991: 222) implies that equations (33)−(36) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for
an efficient steady-state solution to the dynamic optimization problem given by equation
(29). Proof of uniqueness is also provided in Appendix A
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¡
r + s+ φθ1−α
¢ ¡r + s+ αθ1−α¢¡
r + s+ θ1−α
¢ = η (r + s) (y (u)− b)
(1− η) (y (s)− y (u)) (35)
γ
¡
r + s+ αθ1−α
¢
= (1− α) θ−α (y (u)− b) (36)
Proposition 2 An efficient steady state allocation with cross-skill matching
can be summarized by a tuplet {θSP , φSP , ηSP , uSP} that solve conditions
(33)− (36).
Proof: Appendix A
Equations (35) and (36) are, respectively, the efficient equal-value condition
and the optimality condition for the mass of skilled jobs, while (33) and (34)
coincide with eqs. (15) and (16). To characterise the efficiency properties of a
cross-skill matching equilibrium we can therefore limit attention to eqs. (21)
and (22) for the equilibrium and (35) and (36) for the efficient allocation. It
is easy to show that these conditions never coincide.
First of all, from the conditions for the mass of skilled jobs, eqs. (22)
and (36), it follows immediately that θE = θSP whenever β is equal to α. In
the matching literature this condition is commonly referred to as the Hosios’
condition. Thus, whenever the Hosios’ condition is satisfied, the decentralised
equilibrium generates the same number of jobs per unemployed worker as the
optimal allocation. Nonetheless, plugging β = α and θE = θSP into (21) and
(35) shows that the equilibrium mix of jobs is not efficient. The latter would
require that β = α = 1.
Proposition 3 A cross-skill matching equilibrium {θE, φE, ηE, uE} never co-
incides with an efficient allocation as defined in Proposition 2.
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Proof: Appendix B
Proposition 3 strengthens the well-known efficiency result of Hosios (1990).
For an economy with homogenous agents, he shows that efficiency is attained
if workers obtain a share β = α of the match surplus. The above result
shows that this potential for efficiency is destroyed when agents are ex ante
heterogenous.
4.1.1 Over-creation of skilled jobs
In general, it is notoriously difficult to characterise the efficiency properties
with heterogenous agents. Nonetheless, for the case in which the bargain-
ing strength of workers satisfies Hosios’ condition, we are able to provide a
complete characterisation. In particular,
Proposition 4 Under Hosios’ condition, θE = θSP but firms create too few
unskilled jobs as φE < φSP .
Proof: Appendix B
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is that low-skill workers (high-skill
workers) are over-valued (under-valued) in equilibrium, leading to an over-
creation of skilled jobs and an under-creation of unskilled jobs. Thus, under
Hosios’ condition, we find that low-skill workers experience a suboptimally
high rate of unemployment. Formally, let u˜(l)E and u˜(l)SP denote the un-
employment rates of low-skill workers in the equilibrium and in the efficient
allocation, then:
Corollary 5 Under the Hosios’ condition, u˜(l)E > u˜(l)SP .
The distortion of the relative wages can be understood by looking at the
expressions for the outside options and the shadow values of both types of
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workers. For instance, in the case of high-skill workers, we obtain
rU(h) = b+ βθ1−α
½
φY (h, u) + (1− φ)Y (h, s)− rU(h)
r + s
¾
(37)
(r + s)λ(h) = b+ θ1−α {φY (h, u) + (1− φ)Y (h, s)− λ(h)}−
(1− α) θ1−α{(1− η) [φY (h, u) + (1− φ)Y (h, s)− λ(h)] + ηφ (Y (l, u)− λ(l))},
(38)
where λ(l) denotes the shadow value of a low-skill worker. According to
(37), the reservation wage of a high-skill worker is equal to the flow value of
leisure, b, plus the expected capital gain from employment in either a skilled
or an unskilled job. The main difference with (38) is the negligence of the
congestion effects. In equation (38), (r + s)λ(h) is equal to the flow value
of leisure, b, plus the expected capital gain from employment, minus the
congestion externality of an additional high-skill unemployed on workers of
the same type (high-skill),
(1− α) θ1−α (1− η) [φY (h, u) + (1− φ)Y (h, s)− λ(h)]
and on workers of the other type (low-skilled),
(1− α) θ1−αηφ (Y (l, u)− λ(l)) .
In the absence of heterogeneity, this congestion externality corresponds ex-
actly to a share 1 − α of the expected capital gain from employment. Un-
der Hosios’ condition, the congestion externality is therefore perfectly inter-
nalised in the wage, leading to an efficient allocation.
In contrast, in our economy we have two types of workers and high-
skill workers congest the market for some low-skill workers, who are less-
productive. The congestion externality is therefore smaller than 1 − α of
the expected match surplus of a high-skill worker. Conversely, low-skill job
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seekers congest the market for some more productive high-skill workers. For
this category of workers, the congestion externality is therefore larger than
1 − α of their expected match surplus. In other words, under the Hosios’
condition, the relative wage payments are distorted. All high-skill workers
are under-valued (in the sense that their outside option is lower than their
shadow value), while the opposite holds for low-skill workers.
Next, consider the effect on profits. In our setup, the under-valuation of
high-skill workers increases the profits of all jobs in the same way, while the
over-valuation of low-skill workers only affects unskilled jobs. As a result, in
equilibrium, firms will create too few unskilled jobs, since they have to pay
low-skill workers more than their shadow value. Furthermore, since θE = θSP
this implies that firms create a suboptimally large share of skilled jobs.5
Finally, although our model is admittedly simple, the intuition behind
the distortion of the relative wages can easily be extended to an economy
with N > 2 types of agents. In such an economy, all workers with an above-
average expected productivity would be under-valued, while all agents with
a below-average expected productivity would be over-valued.
4.2 Ex post segmentation
We now proceed with a characterization of the efficient allocations with ex
post segmentation. In this case, it is not efficient for high-skill workers to
match with unskilled vacancies because y(u)− (r + s)λ(h) < 0.
An efficient ex post segmentation allocation is characterized by the vec-
5The result that firms create exactly θE = θSP jobs per unemployed worker is due to
the fact that the expected wage costs of an unskilled job equals the expected marginal
productivity of applicants. To obtain this result we need to take the weighted average
of workers’ outside options. When we repeat this calculation for workers’ shadow values
(using identical weights η and 1− η) we see that the two quantities coincide. For details
see Appendix B.
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tor of endogenous variables {θSP , φSP , ηSP , uSP} satisfying the following
equations:
φθ1−αηu = s(µ− ηu) (39)
(1− φ) θ1−α (1− η)u = s [(1− µ)− (1− η)u] (40)
γ = θ−αη(1− α)
·
[y(u)− b]
r + s+ [φ− (1− α) η] θ1−α
¸
(41)
γ = θ−α (1− η) (1− α)
·
[y(s)− b]
r + s+ [(1− φ)− (1− α) (1− η)] θ1−α
¸
(42)
Equations (39) and (40) represent the laws of motion for the state variables
u(l) and u(h) when R = 0. As in the decentralized equilibrium, the flow
condition for low-skill workers is the same as under cross-skill matching.
What changes is the flow equation for high-skill workers whose exit rate out of
unemployment falls from θ1−α to (1−φ)θ1−α. Comparing the above conditions
to the conditions for an ex-post segmentation equilibrium we immediately
obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 An ex post segmentation equilibrium never coincides with
the efficient allocation {θSP , φSP , ηSP , uSP} as defined by (39)− (42).
Proof: Appendix A.
For the ex post segmentation case it is difficult to get more analytical results
for the efficiency properties of the equilibrium. What is feasible is to show
that the equilibrium matching set of high-skill workers may be inefficient.
More precisely, given the under-valuation of high-skill workers we may have
cases in which this type of workers accept unskilled jobs in equilibrium while
it would be efficient for them to refuse these jobs. This is the aim of the next
section.
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4.3 Matching decisions
To illustrate the possibility of inefficient matching sets, we consider the ef-
fects of a gradual increase in y(s). Suppose that the initial value for y(s) is
consistent with an efficient cross-skill matching allocation. From eq. (36) it
follows that ∂θSP/∂y(s) is zero. Hence, as in the decentralised equilibrium,
changes in y(s) do not affect the labour market tightness. The only change
is an increase in the fraction of skilled jobs. As we continue to raise y(s),
the shadow value for high-skill workers, λ(h), therefore continues to rise and
beyond some threshold value, say y(s)SP , the planner will prefer to switch
to ex post segmentation. From our previous discussion it is clear that this
switch occurs when y(u)− (r+s)λ(h) < 0. For the decentralised equilibrium
we obtain a similar sequence of changes. However, since (r+ s)λ(h) > rU(h)
it is obvious that the switch to an ex post segmentation equilibrium takes
place at a higher value of y(s). Formally, let y(s)E denote the lowest value of
y(s) for which a cross-skill matching equilibrium is feasible:
Proposition 7 When β = α, y(s)E > y(s)SP .
Proof: Appendix B.
Proposition 7 completes our characterization of the complete set of steady
state allocations. Three cases can be distinguished: First, for y(s) < y(s)SP
we obtain an inefficient cross-skill matching equilibrium. Second, for y(s) ∈
[y(s)SP , y(s)E] we obtain a cross-skill matching equilibrium while the efficient
allocation features ex post segmentation. Finally, for all y(s) ≥ y(s)E we
obtain an inefficient ex post segmentation equilibrium. Hence, the steady
state equilibrium with ex post bargaining is never efficient when agents are
ex ante heterogeneous.
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4.4 Example
In this section we present a numerical example to illustrate the three cases
distinguished above. The baseline parameters are close to the ones in Al-
brecht and Vroman (2002)6. Figures 2 and 3 summarise the effect of a grad-
ual increase in y(s). Three features are noteworthy. First of all, in the region
where y(s) < y(s)SP the decentralised equilibrium is very close to the ef-
ficient allocation. As predicted by Proposition 4, θE = θSP , and invariant
to changes in y(s). Furthermore, due to the large share of low-skill workers
(µ = 2/3), φE is very close to φSP . Second, in the region of the ex post seg-
mentation equilibrium φE is again below φSP , but this time we also find that
θE < θSP . This latter feature explains the larger difference between eu(l)E andeu(l)SP . In addition, it is important to notice that the unemployment rates of
both types of workers are higher under ex post segmentation. For low-skill
workers the higher unemployment rate is due to the discrete fall in φ. The
switch from a cross-skill matching to an ex post segmentation equilibrium is
therefore accompanied by a an increase in eu(l) and a fall in U(l). In contrast,
for high-skill workers the higher unemployment rate is the net-effect of two
opposite forces. On the one hand eu(h) tends to increase because high-skill
workers no longer match with unskilled jobs, while unemployment tends to
decrease as firms are willing to open more skilled jobs. As can be observed in
the figure, the first effect tends to dominate. Moreover, despite the increase
in the unemployment rate, high-skill workers enjoy a discrete jump in their
lifetime income due to the larger fraction of skilled jobs. Finally, for the
region where y(s) ∈ [y(s)SP , y(s)E] we obtain θE < θSP and φE > φSP . The
explanation for this last result is the sharp drop in φSP due to the change
in the efficient allocation from cross-skill matching to ex-post segmentation.
Once y(s) reaches y(s)E, the equilibrium allocation features a similar drop
6Parameter configuration: r = 0.02; s (u) = s(s) = 0.20; b = 0.10; γ = 0.40; y (u) = 1;
α = β = 0.50; µ = 2/3; y (s) ∈ [1.5, 2.5]
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in the share of low-skill jobs and φE becomes again smaller than φSP .
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5 Extensions
In the previous section we showed that Hosios’ condition leads to an excess
supply of skilled jobs. This achieved our first goal. Namely to show that the
competition for “over-qualified” workers may harm low-skill workers. How-
ever, the over-creation of good jobs seems to contradict the concern of policy
makers that labour markets generate too many low-quality jobs.
The aim of this section is twofold. First of all we demonstrate that effi-
ciency can be restored by taxation. And, secondly, we show that the market
can generate too many unskilled jobs when workers’ bargaining strength vi-
olates Hosios’ condition.
5.1 Policy implications
In this section we return to the case of a cross-skill matching equilibrium
and we show that efficiency can be restored through taxation. The instru-
ment that we consider is a lump sum tax or subsidy on unemployed workers.
Other more realistic tax schemes might achieve the same result.7 However,
the taxation scheme that we illustrate below reinforces the intuition on the
undervaluation (overvaluation) of high-skill (low-skill) workers that we pro-
vided in Section 4.
Formally, let τ(h) and τ(l) denote, respectively, the taxes on unemployed
high-skill and low-skill workers, which in principle may be positive (taxes)
or negative (subsidies). To simplify the analysis we ignore the use of the
net tax proceeds.8 The new expressions of the expected lifetime income of
7One example is a hiring tax for skilled jobs. This tax can restore efficiency as it reduces
the expected profits from skilled jobs. Furthermore, the hiring tax would have different
distributional implications than the search taxes and subsidies considered here.
8It is straightforward to introduce a balanced government budget. To avoid distortions
the government should redistribute the tax proceeds through a lump sum payment of size
τ = u(l) · τ(l) + u(h) · τ(h) ≶ 0 to all workers.
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unemployed workers then become as follows:
rU(h) = b− τ(h) + θ1−α {φ [W (h, u)− U(h)] + (1− φ) [W (h, s)− U(h)]}
rU(l) = b− τ(l) + θ1−αφ [W (l, u)− U(l)]
The decentralized equilibrium can be solved in the same way as in the
model without taxes. We make use of the condition, V (s) = V (u) = 0 to
derive the first two equations that characterize the solution, and we obtain
the remaining two equations from the flow conditions.
Proposition 8 For β = α the cross-skill matching equilibrium becomes effi-
cient under the tax scheme {τ ∗(l), τ ∗(h)} that satisfies
τ ∗(l) =
(1− α) (1− φSP ) (θSP )
1−α (1− ηSP ) (y(s)− y(u))
ηSP
£
r + s+ (θSP )1−α
¤ (43)
τ ∗(h) = −(1− α) (1− φSP ) (θSP )
1−α (y(s)− y(u))£
r + s+ (θSP )1−α
¤ (44)
Proof: Appendix B.
In line with our conclusions in Section 4.1, Proposition 8 implies that gov-
ernments should impose a tax on low-skill job seekers. The size of this tax
is proportional to the reduction in the mass of skilled jobs due to an ad-
ditional low-skill job seeker times the productivity differential y(s) − y(u).
Conversely, high-skill job seekers should receive a subsidy proportional to
the reduction in the matching rate of workers due to an additional low-skill
job seeker times the share of skilled jobs (1− φSP ) times the productivity
differential y(s) − y(u). When the tax scheme satisfies (43) and (44), the
congestion externalities are therefore perfectly internalised.
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5.2 Changes in the bargaining power
To conclude our analysis we now consider the effect of different bargaining
strengths. In our model, changes in the bargaining power of workers have
two effects. First, as in a standard matching model the profits of jobs are a
decreasing function of β. The equilibrium labour market tightness is therefore
negatively correlated with β. Second, changes in workers’ bargaining strength
affect the relative profits of both types of jobs and this results in changes in
φE. We can prove that this relation between φE and β is non-linear:
Proposition 9 The share of skilled jobs 1−φE follows an inverted U pattern
in β. It achieves a maximum value 1−φE > 1−φSP when workers’ bargaining
strength satisfies Hosios’ condition.
Proof: Appendix B.
Since 1− φE is increasing for β < α and decreasing for β > α, the following
corollary is immediate:
Corollary 10 Over-creation of unskilled jobs (φE > φSP ) may occur for
sufficiently low or high values of β.
The intuition behind Corollary 10 is easy to explain for the case β > α. In
this case workers appropriate a suboptimally large share of the match surplus.
Given that the skilled jobs are more valuable, this reduces the relative profits
of skilled jobs leading to a reduction in 1−φE. Other things equal, an increase
in β therefore improves the matching rate of low-skill workers.
To obtain the overall effect on the unemployment rates of both types of
workers we need to combine the changes in θE and φE. For high-skill workers
this results in a positive relationship between eu(h) and β as ∂θE/∂β < 0.
Instead, for low-skill workers the effect is ambiguous. Nonetheless, our nu-
merical results seem to indicate that ∂eu(l)/∂β > 0.
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Table 1.Comparative statics of changes in β
θ φ η eu eu(h) eu(l)
1.68 0.948 0.676 0.138 0.133 0.140
β = 0.30 3.82 0.989 0.669 0.093 0.092 0.093
β = 0.40 2.50 0.955 0.675 0.115 0.112 0.116
β = 0.50 1.68 0.944 0.677 0.138 0.133 0.140
β = 0.60 1.11 0.953 0.675 0.163 0.159 0.165
β = 0.70 0.70 0.988 0.668 0.194 0.193 0.195
Parameter configuration: r = 0.02; s (u) = s(s) = 0.20; b = 0.10; γ =
0.40; y (u) = 1; y (s) = 1.5; α = 0.50; µ = 2/3.9
Table 1 reports the comparative static effects of changes in β. The first
row represents the efficient allocation. Inspection of the table shows that this
allocation is almost identical to the decentralised equilibrium for β = 0.5.
The only difference is the small over-creation of skilled jobs (φE = 0.944
versus φSP = 0.948). When Hosios’ condition is satisfied, the decentralised
equilibrium is therefore nearly efficient. In contrast, for values of β above
(below) α, we obtain an over-creation of unskilled jobs combined with a sub-
optimally low (high) value for θ. Furthermore, for low-skill workers the fall
in θ dominates the increase in φE. At a higher value of β low-skill workers,
therefore, experience a higher unemployment rate eu(l). Our numerical results
yield a clear testable prediction about the relationship between the unem-
ployment rate, the labour share and the degree of skill-mismatch. That is, in
economies with a high labour share we should observe a high unemployment
rate, a low share of skilled jobs and a large amount of high-skill workers em-
ployed on unskilled jobs.10 Over-education is documented to be a prominent
9The benchmark values are very close to the values in Albrecht and Vroman (2002).
10According to our results overeducation should also be prominent in economies with a
very low labour share. In this case the explanation is less straightforward. Apparently, in
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feature in European labour markets (e.g. Eurostat (2003)). However, so far
this phenomenon has not been related to the size of the labour share.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we characterised the efficiency of the resource allocation in a
matching model with heterogeneous agents. The conceptual framework is
taken from Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and we show that the equilibrium
allocation with ex post bargaining is never efficient. In particular, when
workers’ bargaining strength satisfies Hosios’ condition, low-skill workers
are overvalued in equilibrium and as a result firms create too few unskilled
jobs.
This comparison between workers’ shadow value and their expected life-
time income is the main innovation of this paper. It provides an intuitive
explanation for the inefficiency with ex post bargaining. Moreover, although
the model is admittedly simple, the results can be generalised to more com-
plex environments with more than two types of workers and firms and/or
different production technologies.
economies with an over-creation of jobs, θE > θSP , firms prefer to create unskilled jobs to
limit the risk of skill-mismatch.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A (Efficient Allocation)
Proof Proposition 2: Social Planner Problem
Let Hc ≡ Hert be the “Current-value Hamiltonian” associated with maxi-
mization problem (29).
Hc = θ1−αt [u(h)t [RtφtY (h, u) + (1− φt)Y (h, s)] + u(l)tφtY (l, u)] +
+b (u(h)t + u(l)t)− γθt (u(h)t + u(l)t) + λ(l)t
£
s (1− µ− u(l)t)− φtθ1−αt u(l)t
¤
+
+λ(h)t
£
s (µ− u(h)t)− θ1−αt u(h)t (1− φt +Rtφt)
¤
Henceforth, we concentrate on the steady state, suppressing the time depen-
dence of variables. There are three types of necessary first order conditions.
The first one is the optimality condition for matching between high-skill
workers and unskilled vacancies, given by ∂Hc∂R . Taking derivatives of Hc with
respect to R, we have:
∂Hc
∂R
= φθ1−αu(h) [Y (h, u)− λ(h)]
The optimal matching rule, therefore, depends on the sign of [y(u)− (r + s)λ(h)],
as specified in condition (32) in the main text.
The remaining conditions that characterize the steady state solution of this
problem are:
∂Hc
∂u(l)
= rλ (l) ;
∂Hc
∂u(h)
= rλ (h) ;
∂Hc
∂v(u)
= 0;
∂Hc
∂v(s)
= 0 (45)
∂Hc
∂λ(l)
= u˙(l) = 0;
∂Hc
∂λ(h)
= u˙(h) = 0 (46)
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1. Cross-skill matching (R=1)
Under cross-skill matching, the conditions in (45) become:
(r + s)λ (l) = b+ φθ1−α [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]−
− (1− α) θ1−α{(1− η) [φ [Y (h, u)− λ (h)] + (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)]] +
+ηφ [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]} (47)
(r + s)λ (h) = b+ θ1−α [φ [Y (h, u)− λ (h)] + (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)]]−
− (1− α) θ1−α{(1− η) [φ [Y (h, u)− λ (h)] + (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)]] +
+ηφ [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]} (48)
γ = θ−α(1− η) [Y (h, s)− λ(h)]−
−αθ−α{(1− η)φ [Y (h, u)− λ (h)] + (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)] +
+ηφ [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]} (49)
γ = θ−α [(1− η) [Y (h, u)− λ(h)] + η [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]]−
−αθ−α{(1− η)φ [Y (h, u)− λ (h)] + (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)] +
+ηφ [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]} (50)
Combining eqs. (47)− (50) we obtain:
¡
r + s+ φθ1−α
¢ ¡r + s+ αθ1−α¢¡
r + s+ θ1−α
¢ = η (r + s) (y (u)− b)
(1− η) (y (s)− y (u)) (51)
γ
¡
r + s+ αθ1−α
¢
= (1− α) θ−α (y (u)− b) (52)
From the conditions in (46) we obtain
φ =
µθ1−α (1− η) + (µ− η) s
θ1−α (1− µ) η
(53)
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u =
s (1− µ)¡
s+ θ1−α
¢
(1− η)
(54)
Ex post segmentation (R=0)
Similarly, under ex post segmentation, the conditions in (45) become:
(r + s)λ (l) = b+ φθ1−α [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]−
− (1− α) θ1−α {(1− η) (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)] + ηφ [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]} (55)
(r + s)λ (h) = b+ θ1−α (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)]−
− (1− α) θ1−α {(1− η) (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)] + ηφ [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]} (56)
γ = θ−α(1− η) [Y (h, s)− λ(h)]−
−αθ−α {(1− η) (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)] + ηφ [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]} (57)
γ = θ−αη [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]− αθ−α{(1− η) (1− φ) [Y (h, s)− λ (h)] +
+ηφ [Y (l, u)− λ (l)]} (58)
Combining eqs. (55)− (58) we get:
γ
θ−α
= η
·
(1− α) [y(u)− b]
r + s+ φθ1−α − (1− α) ηθ1−α
¸
(59)
γ
θ−α
= (1− η)
·
(1− α) [y(s)− b]
r + s+ (1− φ) θ1−α − (1− α) (1− η) θ1−α
¸
(60)
And, from the conditions in (46) we have:
φ =
µ (1− η) θ1−α + (µ− η) s
θ1−α (η + µ− 2ηµ)
(61)
u =
s (1− µ)¡
s+ (1− φ) θ1−α
¢
(1− η)
(62)
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3. Changes in R
Next, we show that the transition from cross-skill matching to ex post seg-
mentation occurs as we increase the productivity in skilled jobs. We start by
showing that (r + s)λ (h) is an increasing function of y(s).
The shadow value of high-skill workers, λ (h), can be written as follows:
(r + s)λ (h) =
(r + s)(b+A) + αθ1−αSP [φSPy(u) + (1− φSP )y(s)]
r + s+ αθ1−αSP
(63)
where: A = (1− α) θ1−αSP (1− φSP ) (y(s)− y(u)) /(r + s+ θ1−αSP ).
Taking derivatives in (63) with respect to y(s) we have:
∂ [(r + s)λ (h)]
∂y(s)
=
αθ1−αSP [1− φSP −
∂φSP
∂y(s) (y(s)− y(u))] + (r + s)
∂A
∂y(s)
r + s+ αθ1−αSP
(64)
where
∂A
∂y(s)
=
·
1− α
r + s+ θ1−αSP
¸ ·
1− φSP −
∂φSP
∂y(s)
(y(s)− y(u))
¸
> 0
Since ∂φSP∂y(s) < 0 and
³
∂A
∂y(s)
´
> 0, then ∂[(r+s)λ(h)]∂y(s) > 0. Thus, for small values
of y(s), the efficient allocation is in the cross-skill matching case. Starting
from this point, increases in y(s) reduces [Y (h, u)− λ(h)], and for a threshold
value, y¯(s)SP , the efficient allocation may shifts to the ex post segmentation
case. The same exercise shows that the efficient allocation may change from
cross-skill matching to ex post segmentation for some minimum threshold
value of 1− µ.
Arrow’s Sufficiency Theorem:
Arrow’s generalization of Mangasarian’s sufficiency theorem (Kamien and
Schwartz, 1991: 222) states that conditions (51) − (54) are necessary and
sufficient for {θ, φ, η, u} to be the steady-state solution to the dynamic opti-
mization problem (29), when R = 1, if the maximized Hamiltonian function
H0 (the Hamiltonian evaluated along φ∗ and θ∗, where φ∗ and θ∗ are given
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by eqs. (33) and (36) respectively) is concave in the variables u(h) and u(l)
for given λ(h) and λ(l). This implies that the Hessian matrix specified below
must be negative semidefinite:
HES =
Ã
∂2H0
∂2u(l)
∂2H0
∂u(l)∂u(h)
∂2H0
∂u(h)∂u(l)
∂2H0
∂2u(h)
!
Taking derivatives with respect to u(h) and u(l) in H0 we obtain:
∂2H0
∂2u(l)
=
2µ (u(h))2
¡
s+ (θ∗)1−α
¢
(y(u)− y(s))
(1− µ) (u(l))3 (r + s)
< 0
∂2H0
∂2u(h)
=
2µ
¡
s+ (θ∗)1−α
¢
(y(u)− y(s))
(1− µ)u(l)(r + s) < 0
∂2H0
∂u(l)∂u(h)
=
∂2H0
∂u(h)∂u(l)
=
−2µu(h)
¡
s+ (θ∗)1−α
¢
(y(u)− y(s))
(1− µ) (u(l))2 (r + s)
> 0
Operating with the previous expressions we obtain that |HES| = 0. Thus,
since ∂
2H0
∂2u(l) < 0,
∂2H0
∂2u(h) < 0 and |HES| = 0, the Hessian matrix is nega-
tive semidifinite which gives us the necessary and sufficient conditions for
{θ, φ, η, u} to be a steady-state solution for the dynamic optimization prob-
lem (29) when high-skill workers accept unskilled job offers11. Nonetheless,
since the Hessian matrix is negative semidifinite, this does not guarantee
uniqueness.
Uniqueness of the cross-skill matching efficient allocation
From equation (52), we know that ∂θSP/∂µ = 0. Using this result, we
establish uniqueness by showing that d (1− φ) /d(1− µ) < 0.
11The Hessian matrix is not very difficult to be computed for the cross-skill matching
case. However, applying Arrow’s generalization of Mangasarian’s sufficiency theorem to
the dynamic optimization problem (29) when R = 0 (ex post segmentation case), would
require computing the Hessian matrix numerically.
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From equation (53) we obtain:
η
1− η =
µ
¡
s+ θ1−α
¢
(1− µ)
¡
s+ φθ1−α
¢
Substituting into condition (51) we have:
1− µ =
¡
s+ θ1−α
¢
(r + s)
¡
r + s+ θ1−α
¢
(y(u)− b)
∆
(65)
where:
∆ =
¡
r + s+ φθ1−α
¢
(y(s)− y(u))
¡
r + s+ αθ1−α
¢ ¡
s+ φθ1−α
¢
+¡
s+ θ1−α
¢
(r + s)
¡
r + s+ θ1−α
¢
(y(u)− b)
The existence of the cross-skill matching efficient allocation implies that there
exist a solution for (65). Furthermore equation (65) is continuously differen-
tiable, allowing the use of the Implicit Function Theorem. Thus, taking the
total derivative in (65):
d (1− φ)
d (1− µ) =
(
−
"¡
s+ θ1−α
¢
(r + s)
¡
r + s+ θ1−α
¢
(y(u)− b)
∆2
#
∂∆
∂ (1− φ)
)−1
(66)
where:
∂∆
∂ (1− φ) = − (y(s)− y(u))
¡
r + s+ αθ1−α
¢
θ1−α
£
r + 2
¡
s+ φθ1−α
¢¤
< 0
(67)
Uniqueness of the cross-skill matching efficient allocation is proved recur-
sively. First, from equation (52) we derive a unique value of θ. Second, from
(66) and (67), (1− φ) defines a strictly increasing function of (1− µ). Thus,
for any value of (1− µ) we get a unique value of (1− φ). Given unique values
of θ and (1− φ) , from equation (51) we obtain a unique value of η. Finally,
given unique values of θ and η, equation (54) defines a unique value for u.¥
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7.2 Appendix B (Proofs of main results)
Proof Proposition 3: Inefficient cross-skill matching equilibrium
When β = α, from eqs. (22) and (36) we have θE = θSP . Plugging this result
into eqs. (21) and (35) we obtain:
¡
r + s+ βφEθ1−αSP
¢
=
ηE (r + s) (y(u)− b)
(1− ηE) (y(s)− y(u))
(68)
¡
r + s+ φSPθ1−αSP
¢ ¡r + s+ αθ1−αSP ¢¡
r + s+ θ1−αSP
¢ = ηSP (r + s) (y (u)− b)
(1− ηSP ) (y (s)− y (u))
(69)
From (68) and (69) it follows that β = α = 1 is needed for a cross-skill
matching equilibrium to be efficient.¥
Proof Proposition 4
1. Overcreation of skilled jobs:
Plugging β = α, and θE = θSP into (15), (16) and (21) we can derive the
following expression:
µ (r + s) (y (u)− b)
(1− µ) (y (s)− y (u)) =
¡
s+ φEθ1−αSP
¢¡
s+ θ1−αSP
¢ ¡r + s+ αφEθ1−αSP ¢ (70)
Next, proceeding in the same way for the efficient allocation, we combine eqs
(33), (34) and (35) which yields:
µ (r + s) (y (u)− b)
(1− µ) (y (s)− y (u)) =
¡
s+ φSPθ1−αSP
¢ ¡
r + s+ φSPθ1−αSP
¢ ¡
r + s+ αθ1−αSP
¢¡
s+ θ1−αSP
¢ ¡
r + s+ θ1−αSP
¢
<
¡
s+ φSPθ1−αSP
¢ ¡
r + s+ αφSP θ1−αSP
¢¡
s+ θ1−αSP
¢ (71)
The term on the left-hand side of eqs. (70) and (71) is the same, therefore,
we can derive the following inequality:¡
s+ φEθ1−αSP
¢ ¡
r + s+ αφEθ1−αSP
¢
<
¡
s+ φSPθ1−αSP
¢ ¡
r + s+ αφSPθ1−αSP
¢
(72)
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In order for (72) to hold, it must be the case that φE < φSP . As ∂φ/∂η < 0,
then we have ηE > ηSP . ¥
2. Undervaluation (overvaluation) of high-skill (low-skill) workers:
Substituting β = α (θE = θSP ) and the values of J(h, s) and w(h, s) into the
free entry condition for skilled vacancies we obtain:
γ = (1− α) θ−αSP (1− ηE)
·
y(s)− rU(h)
r + s
¸
(73)
On the other hand, the optimality condition for v(s) can be written as follows:
γ = (1− α) θ−αSP (1− ηSP )
·
y(s)
r + s
− λ(h)
¸
(74)
Combining eqs. (73) and (74) we obtain:
(1− ηE)
·
y(s)− rU(h)
r + s
¸
= (1− ηSP )
·
y(s)
r + s
− λ(h)
¸
(75)
When β = α, (1 − ηE) < (1 − ηSP ), then, in order for equation (75) to
hold it must be the case that rU(h) < (r + s)λ(h) (high-skill workers are
undervalued).
Similarly, substituting β = α (θE = θSP ) and the values of J(h, u), J(l, u),
w(h, u) and w(l, u) into the free entry condition for unskilled vacancies, we
have:
γ = (1− α) θ−αSP (1− ηE)
·
y(s)− rU(h)
r + s
¸
+
+(1− α) θ−αSP
½
ηE
·
y(u)− rU(l)
r + s
¸
− (1− ηE)
·
y(s)− y(u)
r + s
¸¾
(76)
while the optimality condition for v(u) can be written as follows:
γ = (1− α) θ−αSP (1− ηSP )
·
y(s)
r + s
− λ(h)
¸
+
+(1− α) θ−αSP
½
ηSP
·
y(u)
r + s
− λ(l)
¸
− (1− ηSP )
·
y(s)− y(u)
r + s
¸¾
(77)
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Combining eqs. (76) and (77), and plugging equation (75) into them, we
have:
ηE
1− ηE
·
y(u)− rU(l)
r + s
¸
=
ηSP
1− ηSP
·
y(u)
r + s
− λ(l)
¸
(78)
When β = α, ηE > ηSP then, in order for equation (78) to hold, it must be
true that: rU(l) > (r + s)λ(l) (low-skill workers are overvalued). ¥
3. Identical labour market tightnesses (θE = θSP )
Making use of the expression of rU(h), given by equation (37), and the
analogous expression for rU(l) given by:
rU(l) = b+ βφθ1−α
·
Y (l, u)− rU(l)
r + s
¸
, (79)
the weighted average of workers’ outside options can be written as:
ηrU(l) + (1− η)rU(h) = b+ βθ1−α{ηφ
·
Y (l, u)− rU(l)
r + s
¸
+
(1− η)
·
φY (h, u) + (1− φ)Y (h, s)− rU(h)
r + s
¸
} (80)
Following the same reasoning, we use the expression of λ(h), given by equa-
tion (38), and the expression of λ(l) given by:
λ(l) = b+ φθ1−α [Y (l, u)− λ(l)]−
(1− α) θ1−α{(1− η) [φY (h, u) + (1− φ)Y (h, s)− λ(h)] + ηφ (Y (l, u)− λ(l))},
(81)
to derive the following expression for the weighted average of workers’ shadow
values:
η(r + s)λ(l) + (1− η)(r + s)λ(h) = b+ αθ1−α{ηφ [Y (l, u)− λ(l)] +
(1− η) [φY (h, u) + (1− φ)Y (h, s)− λ(h)]} (82)
Thus, for given η (φ), the two quantities, (80) and (82) coincide when the
Hosios’ condition is satisfied. ¥
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4. Corollary 5: (β = α =⇒ eu(l)E > eu(l)SP )
From (36) we know that changes in µ do not affect θSP , so an increase in µ
implies that, for a given φSP , u(l) will increase. All else equal, this increases
ηSP , so the right-hand side of equation (35) will increase, while the left-hand
side will decrease. Thus, for equation (35) to hold, φSP has to increase.
Summarizing, increasing µ makes the creation of low-skill vacancies more
attractive, resulting in an increase of φSP . From this, it is easy to show thateu(l)SP = s/ £s+ φSPθ1−αSP ¤ is a decreasing function of µ. ¥
Proof Proposition 6: Inefficient ex post segmentation equilibrium
Comparing eqs. (27) and (28) with eqs. (41) and (42), it can be derived that
we need β = α = 1 to get efficiency. ¥
Proof Proposition 7: Matching decisions
From Appendix A we know that ∂ [(r + s)λ (h)] /∂y(s) > 0. Thus, to demon-
strate that y(s)E > y(s)SP , we first need to show that rU(h) is an increasing
functions of y(s). Taking derivatives of rU(h) with respect to y(s) we obtain:
∂ [rU(h)]
∂y(s)
=
βθ1−αE
h
1− φE −
∂φE
∂y(s) (y(s)− y(u))
i
r + s+ βθ1−αE
> 0 (83)
since ∂φE/∂y(s) = (∂φE/∂ηE) (∂ηE/∂y(s)) < 0.
Thus, rU(h) and (r+ s)λ (h) are monotonically increasing functions of y(s).
Moreover, by Proposition 4, we know that (r+s)λ (h) > rU(h) ∀y(s). Thus,
it follows that the switch to an ex post segmentation equilibrium takes place
at a higher value of y(s), that is, y(s)E > y(s)SP . ¥
Proof Proposition 8: Optimal tax scheme
Under the tax scheme {τ(l), τ(h)} ∈ <2, the expressions for the outside
options of both types of workers are the following:
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rU(h) = b− τ(h) + θ1−α {φ [W (h, u)− U(h)] + (1− φ) [W (h, s)− U(h)]}
rU(l) = b− τ(l) + θ1−αφ [W (l, u)− U(l)]
Substituting rU(h) and rU(l) into the free entry conditions for skilled and
unskilled vacancies, and making use of the equal value condition V (s) = V (u)
we obtain the following expression:
(1− ηE)
£
r + s+ φEθ1−αE
¤
(y(s)− y(u)) = ηE (r + s) (y(u)− b+ τ(l)) (84)
Plugging equation (84) into the free entry condition of skilled jobs we obtain:
γ
£
r + s+ βθ1−αE
¤
= (1− β) θ−αE [y(u)− b+ ηEτ(l) + (1− ηE) τ(h)] (85)
First, comparing eqs. (36) and (85), when β = α, we need
τ(l) = − (1− ηE) τ(h)/ηE (86)
so that θE = θSP = θ. And second, by comparing eqs. (35) and (84) the
optimal value, τ ∗(l), that makes the cross-skill matching equilibrium efficient
is given by:
τ ∗(l) =
(1− α) (1− φSP ) θ1−αSP (1− ηSP ) (y(s)− y(u))
ηSP
£
r + s+ θ1−αSP
¤ (87)
Substituting (87) into (86), we derive the following expression for τ ∗(h):
τ ∗(h) = −(1− α) (1− φSP ) θ
1−α
SP (y(s)− y(u))£
r + s+ θ1−αSP
¤ (88)
¥
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Proof Proposition 9: Overcreation of unskilled jobs
Taking derivatives with respect to β in both sides of equation (22) we obtain:
∂θE
∂β
= −
θE
£
r + s+ θ1−αE
¤
(1− β)
£
(r + s)α+ βθ1−αE
¤ < 0 (89)
which shows that θE is monotonically decreasing in β.
Similarly, taking derivatives with respect to β in equation (21) we have:
∂ηE
∂β
=
ηE (1− ηE)
h
φEθ1−αE + βφE (1− α) θ−αE
³
∂θE
∂β
´i
r + s+ βφEθ1−αE
Substituting equation (89), into the previous expression, we obtain:
∂ηE
∂β
=
·
ηE (1− ηE)φEθ1−αE
r + s+ βφEθ1−αE
¸"
(α− β)
¡
r + s+ βθ1−αE
¢
(1− β)
¡
(r + s)α+ βθ1−αE
¢# (90)
Finally, for a given θE, taking derivatives with respect to β in equation (15)
yields:
∂φE
∂β
= −∂ηE
∂β
" ¡
s+ θ1−αE
¢
µ
(1− µ) θ1−αE η2E
#
(91)
Therefore, from eqs. (90) and (91) we can derive the following result:
α = β ⇒ ∂ηE
∂β
= 0;
∂φE
∂β
= 0
α > β ⇒ ∂ηE
∂β
> 0;
∂φE
∂β
< 0
α < β ⇒ ∂ηE
∂β
< 0;
∂φE
∂β
> 0
From this, it follows that φE > φSP may occur for sufficiently low or high
values of β (Corollary 10). ¥
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7.3 Appendix C
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Figure 4: Comparative statics of changes in β
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